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
3 March 1959

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CENTRAL

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BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET



25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A004300100001-2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25X1 3 March 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *USSR: While calling for a heads-of-government meeting in April, the Soviet notes of 2 March made an ostensible concession by proposing a six-power foreign ministers' conference to discuss a German peace treaty and Berlin. These notes, delivered only six days after Khrushchev's strong public attack on the Western proposal for a conference of foreign ministers, probably are intended to appear responsive to President Eisenhower's press conference remarks on 25 February regarding the need for careful preparations before holding a summit meeting. The Soviet leaders probably believe, however, that their terms for a foreign ministers' conference will be unacceptable to the West but that their apparent flexibility on the scope and composition of a summit meeting will produce a favorable im-25X1 pact in the West. 25 🗶

25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00475A004300100001-2 III. THE WEST France: The French Government's decision to withdraw its Mediterranean Fleet from "its present NATO status" now 2*5*///1 is reported to be scheduled to take effect in April. There has 10 been no publicity thus far and no indications as to when France will officially inform NATO. 2*5***%**1 25X1 Finland - East Germany: A seven-man Finnish parliamentary delegation, headed by Speaker Fagerholm, is planning to visit the Leipzig Fair in East Germany this week, when Khrushchev will also be there. A Finnish Foreign Ministry official considers the visit to be "badly timed." He denies that Finland is contemplating any change in Finnish - East German relations. 25X1 Iceland-Britain: The Icelandic Government on 28 Febru-25% ary protested Britain's intention to move British trawlers under naval protection effective 1 March into areas banned to trawlers by Iceland under its unilaterally extended 12-mile fishing limit. A British Foreign Office official has confirmed that these fishing areas are located within approximately four to nine miles of the coast. There have been no serious incidents since last November, but Icelandic Coast Guard officials fear the move gravely increases the danger of clashes in the congested fishing waters. 25% 25X1 25 💥 *Bolivia: (A mob attack against the US Embassy in La Paz broke out on 2 March, sparked by an article in the Latin American edition of Time magazine which the Bolivian Government had first withheld and then released. The government's decision to permit distribution may have been taken in part with a view to exerting pressure on the United States in a dispute over Bolivia's financial crisis and in part to distract the public from domestic problems. 25X1 3 Mar 59

DAILY BRIEF

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Soviet Notes Offer Ostensible Concession on Foreign Ministers' Conference

The USSR's notes of 2 March are intended as a further demonstration of Moscow's desire for negotiations to work out peaceful settlements of the Berlin and German questions. While calling for a heads-of-government meeting in April at Vienna or Geneva "to avert the dangerous course of events" posed by the Berlin question, the notes made an ostensible concession by proposing a six-power foreign ministers' conference to discuss a German peace treaty and Berlin. These notes, delivered only six days after Khrushchev's speech of 24 February attacking the Western proposal for a four-power foreign ministers' conference, probably are intended to appear responsive to President Eisenhower's press conference remarks on 25 February regarding the need for careful preparations before holding a summit meeting.

Moscow's terms for a conference of foreign ministers, however, appear to be designed to be unacceptable to the West. The notes insist on parity of representation, with Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Soviet side, and demand that the agenda be limited to a German peace treaty and the status of West Berlin. The USSR also set a time limit of "not more than two or three months" for foreign ministers' talks which, in the absence of Western agreement to a summit conference, should be held in April at Vienna or Geneva.

The notes stress Moscow's preference for a heads-of-government meeting and seek to give an impression of flexibility on the scope and composition of such talks. They contend that a summit meeting "could consider a wider range of questions" than the foreign ministers' conference proposed by the West. They list substantially the same agenda proposed by Khrushchev in his 24 February speech. The USSR proposed that summit talks should include, besides the Big Four, "interested countries" such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, as "states bordering on Germany which became the first victims of Hitlerite aggression." The notes also said that both German states "must be represented" in summit talks on a German treaty and the status of West Berlin.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

No Back-up Material

III. THE WEST

Finnish Parliamentary Delegation to Visit East German Trade Fair

A seven-man Finnish parliamentary delegation, headed by Speaker Fagerholm, will visit the Leipzig Fair in East Germany from 5 to 11 March, when Soviet Premier Khrushchev will be there. Finnish Deputy Minister of Communications Korsimo, a close friend of President Kekkonen, will also attend the fair. The delegation, invited by East German parliamentary leader Dickermann and Deputy Premier Rau, will provide the highest level contact between the Finns and the East Germans to date.

Finland officially recognizes neither West nor East Germany, although it exchanges consular and commercial representatives with both. During its visit, the Finnish delegation may be pressed to recognize the East German regime and support the Communist position on Berlin. A Finnish Foreign Ministry official admits the trip is "badly timed" but denies that Finland is contemplating now or in the "definite future" any change in its relations with East Germany. Because of its important trade relations with West Germany and because it fears becoming directly embroiled in the recognition issue, Finland will be reluctant to take any initiative in recognizing

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East Germany.			

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Bolivian Mob Attacks US Embassy

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A Bolivian mob attack on the US Embassy in La Paz and the stoning of a USIA office in the mining center of Potosi on 2 March were sparked by an article in the Latin American edition of Time magazine. The article had aroused all elements of Bolivian public opinion, according to the embassy. Both rightists and leftists issued statements defending Bolivian sovereignty, while the Catholic newspaper said the government may protest to the Organization of American States. The American charge noted before the attack that the Communists were just "coasting."

The magazine--which the government at first confiscated and then released--quoted a US official as jokingly proposing the partition of Bolivia and its problems. The government's decision to permit distribution may have been taken in part with the expectation that the popular reaction would exert pressure on the United States in a dispute over Bolivia's financial policy and in part to distract the public from domestic problems.

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